Zahnwart über Wagenknecht

Wäre das nicht ein passender Beitrag für Ihre Rubrik „Schmähkritik“, Herr Ihle?  Es schreibt Zahnwart, Wärter von Bandschublade, über Lafos neue Flamme:

Ich mag Sahra Wagenknecht nicht.

Einerseits. Andererseits bin ich natürlich der Meinung, dass es eine Alternative geben muss zum alternativlosen Pragmatismus, zur Gestaltungsmacht, die nur in einer Regierungsbeteiligung liegt, selbst wenn man dafür alle linken Ideale aufgeben muss. Ich finde es wichtig, dass es etwas gibt wie die kommunistische Plattform, einen Stachel im Fleisch des Parlaments, der sich eben nicht den Sachzwängen anpasst. Nur dass dieser Stachel ausgerechnet von Sahra Wagenknecht repräsentiert wird, das passt mir nicht, von Sahra Wagenknecht, bei der ich mich tatsächlich frage, ob sie wirklich eine linke ist und nicht doch ein arrogante, durch und durch bourgeoise Schnalle.

Und ganz davon abgesehen, freue ich mich, dass Oskar Lafontaine eine neue Freundin gefunden hat. Jeder Topf findet irgendwann seinen Deckel, und Unsympathin zu Unsympath, doch, das passt.

5 Gedanken zu “Zahnwart über Wagenknecht

  1. Mit dem Link zu Ihle hast du mir keinen Gefallen getan. Ausgerechnet der Chodorkowski taucht da auf, der kalte Putschist durch die Hintertür, der mit einem Deal mit ExxonMobile und Chevron unter Vermittlung durch Cheney, Rice und den alten Bush/die Carlyle Group sein Imperium mit einer Sperrminorität an die Amerikaner verkaufen und denen somit die Kontrolle über die russische Energiepolitik gewähren wollte … Der die Duma-Abgeordneten bestach, um ihm die Machtergreifung zu erleichtern und vor allem das doofe Bodenschätze-Gesetz zu verhindern. Diese korrupte komsomolzische Drecksau, Entschuldigung, wir als das Opfer dargestellt … Unfaßbar.

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      1. Doch, doch. Der wollte das russische Wahlgesetz so verändern lassen, daß nur er allein davon profitieren würde. Ich zitiere es der Einfachheit halber mal:

        The Real Meaning Of The Yukos Affair

        A defining event in Russian energy geopolitics took place in 2003. Just as Washington proclaimed its intent to militarize Iraq and the Middle East, regardless of world protest or international law, Putin ordered the spectacular public arrest of Russia’s billionaire oligarch, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, on charges of tax evasion. Putin then surprised Western
        observers by freezing shares of Khodorkovsky’s giant Yukos Oil group, in effect, putting it under state control.
        What had triggered Putin’s dramatic action?
        Khodorkovsky was arrested four weeks before a decisive election in the Russian Duma, or lower house. It was reliably alleged that Khodorkovsky, using his vast wealth, had bought the votes of a majority. Control of the Duma was the first step by Khodorkovsky in a plan to run against Putin the next year as President. The Duma victory would have allowed him to change election laws in his favor, as well as to alter a controversial law being drafted in the Duma, „The Law on Underground Resources.“
        That law would prevent Yukos Oil and other private companies from gaining control of underground raw materials, or from developing private pipeline routes independent of Russia’s state pipelines.
        Khodorkovsky had violated the pledge the oligarchs had made to Putin — that if they stayed out of Russian politics and repatriated a share of their stolen money (in effect, stolen from the state in rigged bidding under Yeltsin) they would be allowed to keep their assets.
        Khodorkovsky’s arrest came shortly after reports of an unpublicized Washington meeting that July between Khodorkovsky and Vice President Dick Cheney. After the Cheney meeting, Khodorkovsky began talks with ExxonMobil and ChevronTexaco (US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s old firm) about acquiring a major stake of up to 40% in Yukos.
        In other words, Khodorkovsky, the most powerful oligarch at the time, was evidently serving as the vehicle for a Washington-backed putsch against Putin.
        The 40% stake in Russia’s Yukos would have given Washington, via US oil giants, a de facto veto power over future Russian oil and gas pipelines and oil deals. Just days before his October 2003 arrest, Khodorkovsky had entertained George H.W. Bush, who had come to Moscow on behalf of the powerful Carlyle Group, to discuss the US buy-in of Yukos. Bush discreetly resigned his position with Carlyle just after the arrest of Khodorkovsky and his partner, Platon Lebedev, chairman of Group Menatep.
        Khodorkovsky also served as an energy consultant to the same Washington Carlyle Group whose partners included former US Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci and former US Secretary of State, James Baker III. Carlyle was known as a power firm in Washington for good reason.
        At the time of Khodorkovsky’s arrest, Yukos had just begun steps to acquire Sibneft, one of Russia’s largest oil producing and refining groups. The combined Yukos-Sibneft enterprise, with 19.5 billion barrels of oil and gas, would then have owned the second-largest oil and gas reserves in the world after ExxonMobil. The Exxon or Chevron buy-up of Yukos-Sibneft would have been a literal energy coup d’etat. Cheney knew it; Bush knew it; Khodorkovsky knew it. Above all, Vladimir Putin knew it
        and moved decisively to block it.
        Khodorkovsky’s arrest signalled a decisive turn by the Putin government towards rebuilding Russia and erecting strategic defenses. It took place in the context of the brazen US grab for Iraq in 2003. Putin’s bold move was also less than two years after the Bush Administration announced that the USA was unilaterally abrogating its treaty obligations with Russia under the earlier Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in order
        to go ahead with development of new US missiles. This was viewed in Moscow as a clearly hostile act aimed at her security.
        By 2003, it took little strategic military acumen to realize that the Pentagon hawks, and their allies in the armaments industry and Big Oil, had a vision of a United States unfettered by international agreements and acting unilaterally in its own best interests, as defined, of course, by the neo-conservative PNAC. The events in Russia were soon followed by Washington-financed covert destabilizations in Eurasia — the Color Revolutions against governments on Russia’s periphery.
        By the end of 2004 it was clear to Moscow that a new Cold War — this one over strategic energy control and unilateral nuclear primacy — was looming.
        After 2003, Russian foreign policy, especially its energy policy, reverted to the axioms of ‚Heartland‘ geopolitics as defined by Sir Halford Mackinder, politics which had been the basis of earlier Soviet Cold War strategy since 1946.
        Putin began to make a series of defensive moves to restore some tenable form of equilibrium in the face of Washington’s increasingly obvious policy of encircling and weakening Russia. Subsequent US strategic blunders made the job a bit easier for Russia. Now, with the stakes rising on both sides—NATO and Russia—Putin’s Russia moved beyond simple defense to a new dynamic offensive aimed at securing a more viable geopolitical position by using its energy as the lever.

        Aus: F. William Engdahl: „Full Spectrum Dominance“, pp. 58-60, Quellenangaben in Fußnoten weggelassen.

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  2. Doch, Machtergreifung. Hitler, falls du auf den anspielst, wurde die Macht übergeben. Er wurde nicht gewählt, sondern ernannt. Er mußte sie sich also nicht nehmen. Alles weitere regelten Reichstagsbrandverordnung und Notstandsgesetze, aber davor war er eben schon an der Macht.

    Chodorkowski wollte sie sich nehmen. Die russischen Oligarchen sind da nicht wählerisch. Von den 32 Tycoons im Bereich der Metallurgie leben noch zwei oder drei. Dort ist heftigstes Nehmen angesagt.

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